Mr. Michael Annett
Chief Executive Officer
Returned & Services League (VIC)
ANZAC House – 4 Collins Street
Melbourne VIC 3000 

01st June 2006

Dear Mr Annett,

As alluded to in my email of the 29th I now write to fill in several of the details with reference to my request for support from the RSL regarding the issue of Agent Orange contamination of potable water aboard HMA Ships during the Vietnam War (1965-1972).

In recent times, former members of the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) have found themselves being the subject of investigations into water contamination, and having statistics quoted back at them stating that they were more at risk from Agent Orange and its derivatives than what the shore based personnel ever were. I hope the current Federal Government doesn’t conveniently forget the soldiers brought back home on the return journey by HMAS Sydney, we having, unbeknown to us, filled our fresh water tanks with contaminated water. They, as do we, deserve better than this. It would be analogous to undertaking an investigation into deep vein thrombosis in air travellers by only testing the flight-crew.

Mr Annett, you may have noted recent articles in the Melbourne Herald Sun (20th March p. 12, 08th April pp.25-26 and 10th April p.14) by Neil Wilson, regarding this very same issue, He, in similar fashion to us, is very keen to get hold of a copy of the DVA epidemiological study which has, to this date, been in process for in excess of three years. This begs the question - how valid will this dated information be? I, for one, can only presume that our particular part of the epidemiological study was based upon figures provided by DVA when there were only 10,700 RAN members recorded as having served in the logistical support role. These details were subsequently mentioned in the first edition of the Nominal roll of Vietnam Veterans (1996). The latest figures this Association has obtained from an informal, updated and yet to be published nominal roll puts the number of RAN members who served in the logistical support role as at 28th February 2006, at 12,918; almost 2,500 more than when the study first started in December 2002, with more entries being submitted and checked almost every day.

Nobody in authority has even appeared slightly worried or concerned about the soldiers and airmen we brought home. Each of the return trips noted below as having Army or RAAF personnel on board would have seen anything upwards of five hundred of these people in the so called ‘safe’ environment of HMAS Sydney; glad of a warm meal, a ‘brew’ whenever they wanted it, and able to take a regular shower (albeit a very short one). After serving ashore for almost twelve months, these people were then exposed to the same contaminated water as we were. Why haven’t they been included in these studies? Surely the RSL and like-minded ex-service organisations need to ask the same questions that we have been asking for some considerable time. The following data amplifies the point regarding sailors doing the round trip, and others such as Army and RAAF Units returning to Australia and partaking of the same contaminated water while in transit from Vietnam to Australia.

Trip 01 – May/June 1965 – 725 RAN only for the round trip
Trip 02 – September/October – 840 RAN only for the round trip
Trip 03 – April/May 1966 – 732 RAN only for the round trip
Trip 04 – May/June 1966 – 692 RAN only for the round trip
Trip 05/06 – April/May 1967 659 RAN & 500+ 5RAR returning *
Trip 07 – May/June 1967 681 RAN & 500+ 6RAR returning *
Trip 08 – Dec. 1967/January 1968 731 RAN only for the round trip
Trip 09 – January/February 1968 738 RAN only for the round trip
Trip 10 – March/April 1968 736 RAN & 500+ 7RAR returning *
Trip 11 – May/June 1968 757 & 500+ 2RAR returning *
Trip 12 – November 1968 709 RAN only for the round trip
Trip 13 – February 1969 606 RAN & 500+ 1 RAR returning *
Trip 14 – May 1969 686 RAN & 500+ 4RAR returning *
Trip 15 – November/December 1969 ? RAN & 500+ 9RAR returning *
Trip 16 – February/March 1970 631 RAN & 500+ 5RAR returning *
Trip 17 – October/November 1970 695 RAN & 500+ 8RAR returning *
Trip 18 – February/March 1971 674 RAN & 506 7RAR returning *
Trip 19 – March/April 1971 613 RAN only for the round trip
Trip 20 – May/June 1971 630 RAN & 500+ 2RAR returning *
Trip 21 – September/October 1971 567 RAN & 518 3RAR returning *
Trip 22 – October/November 1971 612 RAN & Army support units *
Trip 23 – Nov/Dec. 1971 617 RAN & 365 4RAR & RAAF returning *
Trip 24 – Feb/March 1972 663 RAN & 474 Army personnel returning *
Trip 25 – November 1972 609 RAN & 44 Army personnel for round-trip 

The above figures have been gained from official documentation. Where numbers of RAN personnel are concerned, these numbers were obtained from the crew lists for HMAS Sydney for each of her 25 trips. There was only one trip - Trip 15, which was incomplete, because the list of officers borne for that trip was missing. Where numbers of Army and RAAF personnel are concerned, these numbers were obtained from HMAS Sydney Commanding Officer’s Report of Proceedings (ROP), for the trips when the ship had Army and RAAF personnel aboard who were returning to Australia. The return trips are those indicated by an asterisk. The only departure from this is Trip 25, for which the 44 troops carried in HMAS Sydney were considered to be part of the ship’s company and participated in the whole journey. It may therefore be concluded, with some confidence, that between 7,000 to 7,500 personnel from the other two services would not have been included in the as yet to be published contaminated water study. In the opinion of this writer, they should have been.

If my suggestions are correct - and I think they are, the study has been based upon the original 10,700 RAN members involved in the logistical support role and the numbers of RAN personnel involved in what was colloquially known as ‘Gun-line’ and other combat related service which accounts for at least another 2,858 [1] personnel which neatly fits the ‘over 13,000 RAN Vietnam veterans’ statement made by the Minister on or around the 08th of April 2006, in response to questions posed by Neil Wilson of the Melbourne Herald-Sun.  In fact it should have been more, at least by another 3,000, making numbers of RAN Vietnam veterans as being closer to the vicinity of 16,000.

The publication which will have formed the basis of the above, as yet to be published study would have been Mortality of Vietnam Veterans: the Veteran Cohort Study, which was carried out in 1997 on behalf of the DVA by the University of Western Sydney (UWS). At Chapter 9 of this publication sub-section 9.1, sub-titled Mortality compared with Australian males, it is reported that: “The estimated Standard Mortality Rates (SMR) for 1980-1994, which also take account of under-ascertainment of deaths, varied by branch of service:”

1.00 (95% CI 0.94 to 1.05) for Army Vietnam Veterans

1.12 (95% CI 0.97 to 1.27) for Air Force Vietnam Veterans; and

1.37 (95% CI 1.23 to 1.52) for Navy Vietnam Veterans [2]

These figures tend to suggest that, for the years 1980-1994, Navy Vietnam Veterans were at least one-third more likely to have died during this period when compared to (a) the general population of Australian males, and (b) the other two branches of the Australian Defence Force (ADF). Support for this assertion is also contained in a study titled Cancer Incidence in Australian Vietnam Veterans (2004), in which Wilson, Horsley and Van der Hoek have stated: “The incidence of cancer varied by service branch. Navy veterans had the highest incidence rate of cancer of the three service branches, elevated by 28 %.” (p.3678)[3]

The seven (7) Statements of Principle (SOP) that the Repatriation Medical Authority have amended to include consumption of potable water now incorporates the following sub-paragraph under the sub-heading of “Factors”. For example; the SOP for Hodgkin’s lymphoma at 5, Factors, (c) states that one of the factors “that must as a minimum exist before it can be said that a reasonable hypothesis has been raised connecting Hodgkin’s lymphoma” etc, etc, includes:

(c)   being:
(i)    on land in Vietnam, or
(ii)   at sea in Vietnamese waters, or
(iii) on board a vessel and consuming potable water supplied on that vessel, when the water supply had been produced by evaporative distillation of estuarine Vietnamese waters, for a cumulative period of at least thirty days, at least five years before the clinical onset of Hodgkin’s lymphoma;

Yet - by comparison, a claim by a veteran for the very same medical condition, when viewed by the United States Department of Veterans’ Affairs under the regulations contained in U.S. Public Law 102-4, is considered valid or otherwise, courtesy of what the U.S. authorities term ‘a Presumptive Service-Connection’ which, when applied to a veteran’s claim, simply presumes that:

Any veteran who served in Vietnam between January 9, 1962, and May 7, 1975, and has one or more of the diseases on the list of presumptive conditions that the VA maintains is presumed by VA to have been exposed to herbicides, and therefore that his or her disease is recognized for service-connection if rated as 10 percent or more disabling. (p.4)[4]

Section 3.313(a) of the United States Code of Federal Regulations specifically defines service in Vietnam as including: “serving in the waters offshore, or service in other locations if the conditions of service involved duty or visitation in Vietnam.” There does not appear to be any form of mandatory time limits imposed on ‘time in the zone’ or amount of exposure required for one to qualify for treatment or compensation for Agent Orange related illnesses. The only real stipulation is that the condition is rated, through medical evaluation, as being 10 per cent or more disabling.

It seems to me to be rather strange that on one hand we have the most scientifically advanced nation on earth (U.S.) being quite accepting of the fact that there is a valid connection between exposure to Agent Orange and other chemicals of similar formulation, and of the many and varied means by which it may be ingested into the human system, and the consequent links to military/naval service in Vietnam. Sadly, similar authorities here in Australia - i.e., the Department of Veterans’ Affairs (DVA) and the Repatriation Medical Authority (RMA) - appear to be far more stringent and far less accommodating in their interpretations of the medical and scientific evidence relating to this and other comparable conditions. Why?

As you would know, South Vietnam was divided up into four military zones. These zones were known as Corps areas One, Two, Three and Four. According to the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) publication titled Vietnam and Agent Orange: (1994) “Three Corps was the most heavily sprayed area in Vietnam, receiving about 53 percent of all herbicide sprays from 1965 to 1971.”  The Rung Sat Special Zone (RSSZ) in Three Corps, located to the South and East of Saigon,  through which the Long Tau Shipping Channel wound its way, “was the most heavily sprayed area in the whole of South Vietnam.” (p.104) Run-off from the spray would have made its way down the Long Tau and into the Bay de Gahn Rai. HMAS Sydney and her escort(s) always anchored in the northern end of the Vung Tau anchorage, adjacent to Can Gio, in order to allow the battalion to disembark while Sydney’s cargo handling crew unloaded their stores and equipment. This anchorage position was a constant one, situated virtually opposite the mouth of the Long Tau Shipping Channel, where the channel meets the Baie de Gahn Rai.

The U.S. Commander Naval Forces Vietnam (COMNAVFORV) has defined the RSSZ as: “The general area of operations bordered on the West by Long An and Co Gong Provinces along the Soi Rap River, on the North by Nhan Trach district of Bien Hoa Province, to the East by Phuoc Tuy Province and to the South by the South China Sea.” The RSSZ was centred 20 miles south-east of Saigon, and measured approximately 18 miles East to West and 20 miles North to South.

I have enclosed a map of herbicide spray missions (1966-1967) carried out in the RSSZ, contained at p.105 of the NAS publication, Vietnam and Agent Orange, which also gives details regarding the date of the mission, the number of gallons sprayed and the type of herbicide agent used.

Initially, the U.S forces were not at all concerned about the after-effects of Agent Orange as, in very simplistic terms, it (Agent Orange) was being used against the enemy.

Of particular interest to Australian Veterans is the assertion by Hardell, Eriksson and Axelson (1998) of the Department of Oncology, Orebro Medical Centre, Sweden, when writing in the International Journal of Health Services, in an article entitled Agent Orange in war medicine: an aftermath myth. They have written that:

The results of some of the epidemiological studies on cancer risk associated with exposure to these compounds have been manipulated and misinterpreted, particularly by the Australian Royal Commission on the Use and Effects of Chemical Agents on Australian Personnel in Vietnam. Furthermore, a book on Australian war history entitled Medicine at War, commissioned by the Federal Government, reiterates several of these misinterpretations, despite available contrary evaluations from Australian and U.S. authorities.

For the Department of Veterans’ Affairs (DVA) to assert that there is insufficient sound medical scientific evidence to link leukaemia and other diseases - such as diabetes with exposure to dioxins - is inferring that the US research that assumes a valid connection is wrong. This assertion, in my opinion, is flying in the face of clinical logic and sound, scientifically based reasoning, carried out by the US National Academy of Sciences – Institute of Medicine – an Institution with a world-wide reputation. 

To recapitulate, I have arranged the following in chronological order to give you an insight into the material upon which this submission is based and to provide you with proper evidence of our concerns.

(1) The Herald Sun report titled Agent Orange Push of the 20th of March 2006 explains the basis of our concerns at that particular point in time.

(2) A two-page follow-up article in the Saturday Herald Sun of the 08th of April 2006 goes into much more detail. This article can be downloaded from our website at www.hmassydney.com and look under ‘Library’, then go to ‘TV and Newspaper articles’. The article is simply titled The Water:

(3) A further Herald Sun report titled War vets hope for cancer payout of the 10th of April gives the Minister for Veterans’ Affairs version of events to that point in time.

(4) An article by Muller et al, (Undated) titled: Co-distillation of Agent Orange and Other Persistent Organic Pollutants in Evaporative Water Distillation is enclosed, and gives an initial insight into the larger issue of water contamination.

(5) A further article by Muller et al (2002) titled: Examination of the Potential of Royal Australian Navy (RAN) Personnel to Polychlorinated Dibenzodioxins and Polychlorinated Dibenzofurans via Drinking Water (75p) at www.dva.gov.au/adf/health_studies/nrcet_final_report.pdf is the report referred to in the former Minister’s Media Release of the 18th of December 2002. Attention is drawn to paragraph two of this document, wherein Mrs Vale has stated that: “She had also asked the Department of Veterans’ Affairs to undertake further research into the study findings, using the results in the current Vietnam Veterans Mortality and Cancer Incidence Study.” This is the four part study which was supposed to be with the Minister in early 2006; however, while the Minister has sighted these reports, he has yet to release them.

(6) Wilson and Horsley (2003), completed an article titled Health Effects of Vietnam Service.  On the second page of this paper, it is reported that: “Of the three service branches, Navy veterans had the highest overall mortality (Standardised Mortality Ratio (SMR) = 1.37; 95% CI, 1.23-1.52) and the only significant elevated overall mortality”, (p.60), and on the fourth page of this report it is also recorded under the sub-heading Recent Developments that: “Possible exposure to dioxin for Navy members through the ingestion and personal use of the potable water was estimated to be several orders of magnitude above what are acceptable today.” (p.62) No mention is made in this report of the men from the other two services returning to Australia aboard HMAS Sydney; it would appear that these people were ignored for the purposes of this and subsequent studies chiefly because they were not members of the RAN.

(7) Wilson and Horsley (2004), in a further article titled Cancer Incidence in Australian Vietnam Veterans recorded on the second page of this paper, under the sub-heading of Results and Discussion, that:  “The incidence of cancer varied by service branch (Table 2). Navy veterans had the highest incidence rate of cancer of the three service branches, elevated by 28%.” (p.3678)          

(8) I have enclosed a chart titled Riviere De Saigon Entrance, which indicates - amongst other things - the position where HMAS Sydney and her escort(s) used to anchor. I do have Admiralty Chart 1016 upon which the Patron of the HMAS Sydney and VLSV Assoc. Commodore J S Dickson has plotted the actual anchorage positions for each of the 25 deployments undertaken by these ships. However, for initial purposes it can be seen that the ships anchored at the northern end of the Vung Tau Peninsular, which is directly adjacent to the mouth of the Saigon River, otherwise known as the Long Tau Shipping Channel, and which in turn empties out into the Baie de Gahn Rai.

(9) I have also enclosed a flight pattern chart of the Rung Sat Area which gives the flight patterns of defoliation missions flown by the USAF in this particular area for 1965-1967, and I draw your attention to map reference 10º 25' Can Gio on this chart.  By then noting the proximity of Can Gio on the anchorage positions of HMAS Sydney, as indicated on the third chart titled Riviere De Saigon, it may be assumed with some certainty that the ships were directly exposed to defoliation overspray and eventual runoff.  

(10) I have also enclosed two self explanatory emails from Eileen Wilson, Epidemiologist, of the Department of Veterans’ Affairs.

(11)Also find enclosed the latest United States Department of Veterans’ Affairs Agent Orange Review of October 2005.  On page four (4) of this document, under the sub-heading Presumptive Service Connections, the conditions under which the DVA will accept dioxin related illnesses are spelt out. At page seven (7), it also lists documents titled Agent Orange Briefs D1 to D13 inclusive, which also spell out in some detail the research carried out prior to the acceptance of an illness or a disease as having a presumptive service connection to service in Vietnam.

(12) I have also enclosed the abstract of an article by Hardell, Eriksson and Axelson (1998) titled Agent Orange in war medicine: an aftermath myth, which is rather critical of previous research carried out and written up as an official history in the publication Medicine at War by O’Keefe and Shaw (1994). This publication forms Volume Three of the Official History of Australia’s Involvement in South-East Asian Conflicts 1948-1975 and is often referred to by the Australian Department of Veterans’ Affairs to challenge claims by veterans.

I have included page 107 from the Mortality of Vietnam Veterans: the Veteran Cohort Study, which confirms the figures quoted in item six (6) above.

I have also included page 35 from the NRCET Study noted at item five (5) above, which states in part that:

According to reports from RAN personnel the rule on board ship was to produce drinking water primarily during the periods when the ship was in the turbid estuarine water since the water was less pure and could have caused potential damage to the engines if used in boilers. While in the pristine water offshore the distillation units produced water primarily for the ships engine. Hence the drinking water that was produced during the periods in contaminated waters lasted for a significant portion of the return trip (p.35)

Many of the return trips from Vietnam to Australia were upwards of ten to twelve days in length, depending upon the route taken and which port was the first port of call upon return.

As with most submissions of such magnitude, there is certain to be items that have been missed or regarding which explanations will need to be given. However, I feel that most, if not all aspects of our request for support have been covered.

I have provided a copy of this submission to the President of the HMAS Sydney & VLSV Association, Mr. John Atkins, who, I feel, should be included in any future discussions with yourself and the President of the RSL (VIC) regarding this issue.

Regards

Dr. John R Carroll PhD EdD MAPsS
Hon. Secretary
HMAS Sydney & VLSV Assoc. (VIC)
PO Box 645 Heathmont VIC 3135

Email carrollj@bigpond.net.au
‘Phone 9758 2991
‘Phone/Fax 9753 6214